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Introduction 
Many people lose their faith in God, not because of some knock-down argument against it,               
but rather because they were knocked down themselves, whether literally or figuratively, by             
the seemingly faithful. Many such people, those knocked-down by the faithful, are survivors             
of religious trauma and, in some cases, spiritual violence. Adding insult to injury, there’s a               
popular church meme which says: ‘If being hurt by the church causes you to lose faith in                 
God, then your faith was in people, not God’. Memes such as this would have us believe that                  
such survivors never really had faith in God in the first place; it just seemed to them that                  
they did. We believe that the meme is wrong. In particular, we think that it’s possible for                 
some to have faith in God, and then lose that faith due to the actions of others, particularly                  
church people, who shame the former with religious texts and rituals. Church hurt really can               
cause deconversion. That’s what we aim to argue for in this essay. 
Before doing so, we should describe what we take to be the motivation behind the               
church meme and where we think it goes wrong. The meme seems to assume, rightly in our                 
view, that faith in God is a relational attitude. But, at least on what seems to be the                  
motivation behind the church meme, this relational attitude is different from other            
relational attitudes we might have. For, the relational attitudes we might have to our              
friends, colleagues, loved ones, and others all occur in a social context. That is, what               
third-parties say and do influence the relational attitudes we have to other people. For              
instance, a third-party might convince you that someone you were previously not well             
disposed to is a kind and loving person, with the effect that you think better of them and so                   
seek to become closer to them; alternatively, a third-party might convince you that             
someone you previously regarded as a friend is cruel and untrustworthy, with the effect that               
you think less of them and so seek to distance yourself from them. So much is common in                  
our relational attitudes to other people. But, on the motivation behind the church meme,              
faith in God isn’t like this. For, on the view described in the meme, no one can influence a                   
person’s faith in God: whether you seek to grow closer to, or distance yourself from, God is                 
all to do with you and nothing to do with anyone else. And that’s where we think the meme                   
goes wrong. Faith in God, we think, is a relational attitude similar to other relational               
attitudes we have to other people in that faith in God occurs just as much in a social context                   
as do our other relational attitudes. That is, what third-parties say and do can influence a                
person’s faith in God, just as they can with our relational attitudes to other people.  
Think again about how third-parties can influence our relational attitudes to our            
friends, colleagues, loved ones, and others. The examples we gave above were about how              
what third-parties say and do can influence our relational attitudes to other people by              
changing our minds about these other people. But that’s not the only way third-parties can               
influence our relational attitudes. Say that a third-party convinced you that you were             
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somehow unworthy of another’s friendship.​1 You might then withdraw from that friendship,            
seeking to distance yourself from them. Over time, and if you continued to think of yourself                
as unworthy of this friendship, you might then lose this friendship completely. All because              
someone else convinced you that you weren’t worthy of it. We think that something like               
this could happen to a person in their relationship with God. That is, other people can cause                 
a person to lose their faith in God by shaming them with religious texts and rituals such that                  
they come to think of themselves as unworthy of God’s love. Upon thinking of themselves in                
this way, they’ll likely stop doing the things that maintain and promote their relationship              
with God, such as engaging with him, revealing things about themselves, and accurately             
perceiving what God is revealing of himself to them. If this continues, at some point, they’ll                
lose faith in God because they won’t have a relationship with him anymore.  
This is the experience of many lesbian and gay Christians in church,​2 and it’s a form                
of spiritual violence, which sometimes rises to the level of religious trauma, where their              
religious self or world-view is shattered, and they experience deconversion.​3 To give a             
philosophical explanation of this experience, ​4 we begin by outlining the phenomena of            
1 For instance, those suffering from abusive spouses might be convinced that they are              
unworthy of friendship and love from others. 
2 To be sure, not all lesbian and gay Christians who experience the kind of spiritual violence                 
and religious trauma we discuss in this essay lose their faith in God. As Andrew Marin (2016)                 
has shown, through an important survey of lesbian and gay Christians in America, while              
LGBT Christians are twice as likely as those in the general American population to leave their                
faith community after the age of 18, 36% don’t leave their faith community, and so, we                
assume, don’t lose their faith in God. But what may be most interesting, and hopeful, from                
this survey is that, of those who do leave their faith community, 76% are open to returning. 
3 By ‘deconversion’, we mean a loss of faith in God, and, for reasons of space, we don’t give                   
any further analysis of faith beyond that given below, where we argue that having faith in                
God means having an attitude of worship to him, which in turn means loving him. Faith may                 
carry with it all sorts of other things, but spelling those out is beyond the scope of this essay. 
4 Our use of the term ‘philosophical explanation’, following Robert Nozick (1981), signals the              
kind of project we have in mind here, namely, a philosophical, rather than a descriptive or                
normative, project. The problem we address is a philosophical one having the form: How              
could P be, given Q?, where it seems that Q excludes P. Other examples of this form include: 
 
● How could God exist if evil exists? 
● How could we be free if determinism is true? 
● How could we have knowledge of the external world if we could be brains in a vat? 
 
The church meme we quoted takes it to be that a faith lost because of the actions of other                   
people excludes that faith having been in God. In this essay, we try to show that that’s not                  
the case. Moreover, just as when a philosopher gives an answer to one of the above                
questions, they don’t typically claim that it’s the only possible answer, we don’t claim that               
the answer we give here is the only answer to how faith could have been in God yet caused                   
to be lost by the actions of other people. We claim only that the answer we give is one such                    
answer. Thanks to Jonathan Jacobs for his helpful questions prompting this clarification of             
the essay’s project. 
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religious trauma and spiritual violence, making use of Michelle Panchuk’s and Teresa Tobin’s             
work.  
 
Spiritually violent religious trauma 
How long could you live with being called ‘an abomination’?​5 This is a question many who                
were brought up Christian and found themselves to be lesbian or gay have asked              
themselves, in one way or another. The first section of Mitchell Gold’s collection of stories,               
Crisis: 40 Stories Revealing the Personal, Social, and Religious Pain and Trauma of Growing              
Up Gay in America​, details experience after experience of this kind of traumatic spiritual              
violence. For example, Bruce Bastian writes, 
 
My real torment went on inside my head. In high school, we started hearing things in                
church that made it clear sex between two boys was an abomination. I got the               
message that if anyone learned the truth about my sexual attractions, I would lose              
my family and most, if not all, of my friends. I felt more and more like there was                  
something wrong with me. I believed I was a disappointment to my god and would               
certainly be a disappointment to my church if anyone found out about the feelings I               
kept hidden deep inside. I became introverted because it was easier, and, of course,              
safer. I was convinced that if anyone discovered my secret, my life would be over . . .                  
There were times when I thought seriously about suicide. But I couldn’t decide which              
would be the bigger sin: being homosexual or taking my own life. I think if anyone                
had found out I was gay then, I would have considered suicide more seriously. But I                
was able to keep my ugly, dark secret hidden. I even started denying it to myself. I                 
tried to believe I could change and be “normal” if I followed church teachings more               
closely. (Bastian 2008, 33) 
 
Many try, as Bastian did, to follow church teachings, but most fail and punish themselves for                
their failure. A particularly graphic example comes from Jared Horsford: 
 
“FAG” ran across my chest in letters eight inches high, their dimensions blurring and              
elongating as the blood dripped down. I stared at the mirror, bitter irony rolling              
through my mind about how illegible it was, bloody and backwards, in the bathroom              
mirror. I wouldn’t make the same mistake a few months later when I carved “I HATE                
YOU”—backwards this time—across the same skin., both relieved and disappointed          
that my previous message left me unscarred. (Horsford 2008, 76) 
 
Both Bastian and Horsford are survivors of spiritual violence, spiritual violence that has risen              
to the level of religious trauma.  
To explain this kind of experience more generally, we can distinguish religious            
trauma from other kinds of trauma by its causes and its effects. According to Michelle               
Panchuk, occasions of religious trauma typically have the following types of causes:​6 
5 This question is adapted from Gold with Drucker (eds) 2008, xxiv. 
6 It’s notable that religious practices, persons, or reasons are ​central to all the typical causes                
of religious trauma. If someone, a Christian, for instance, is bullied at work and finds out                
later that the person who bullies them is also a Christian, their experience, though it may                
indeed be a case of trauma, isn’t ​religious​ trauma.  
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1. They are justified (by some relevant authority) on religious grounds. A child is told by               
her parents that she must be beaten because it is the command of their God. They                
subsequently beat her. (This constitutes religious trauma justified on religious          
grounds regardless of whether the religious authority cited commands the violence           
to be inflicted.) 
2. They are inflicted for religious reasons. A traumatic incident is inflicted for religious             
reasons, when, for instance, it is purported to be a necessary part of a religious ritual                
or rite.  
3. They are the results of actions performed by (someone claiming) religious authority.            
A priest exploits his position as an authority figure to abuse a young member of his                
church.  
4. They are in response to [putative] actions of the divine itself. ​An earthquake destroys              
a community. A victim of the earthquake is told by (someone she takes to be) a                
religious authority that the earthquake is an act of God as punishment for some              
transgression. (2018, 512) 
 
Typically, occasions of religious trauma have the following kinds of effects: 
 
1. A shattered religious self may cause, for instance, depression, anxiety or           
hypervigilance, sometimes (but not necessarily) triggered in religious contexts.  
2. A shattered religious worldview may lead the victim to believe that (all or a specific)               
religion is mistaken or misguided, that religious communities or people are           
dangerous, cruel, or uncaring, or that the divine itself is dangerous, cruel, or             
uncaring. (2018, 509) 
 
In light of these considerations, Panchuk defines religious trauma in the following way: 
 
Religious trauma is any traumatic experience of the divine being, religious           
community, religious teaching, religious symbols, or religious practice that         
transforms the individual, either epistemically or non-cognitively, in such a way that            
her ability to participate in religious life is significantly diminished. (2018, 513) 
 
She admits that this definition shouldn’t be seen as a strictly philosophical definition; rather,              
she thinks, it groups together a set of ‘relatively similar experiences’ by means of family               
resemblance (2018, 513).​7​ We turn now to introduce the concept of spiritual violence. 
7 Panchuk gives the following two admittedly severe case studies as the strongest             
candidates for providing ‘an all-things-considered reason for deconversion’ (2018, 514) 
 
Case 1: A young child is repeatedly and brutally beaten by her religious parents. She               
is told that since God commanded the Israelites to stone their rebellious children,             
anything they do to her short of that is divinely approved and morally deserved. And               
she believes them. One night, they lock her out of the house as punishment for some                
misdeed. Sitting alone, bruised and bleeding, gazing at the stars, the girl has an              
overwhelming sense of the presence of God—a presence utterly terrifying because           
she perceives it to be of a being who delights in her suffering. This experience               
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As Teresa W. Tobin defines it, spiritual violence  
 
does not name the use of physical force to inflict material harm in the name of God,                 
or for religious purposes, as, for example, in a religiously motivated way. Rather, in              
spiritual violence sacred symbols, texts, and religious teachings themselves become          
weapons that harm a person in her spiritual formation and relationship with God.             
(2016, 134) 
 
Tobin’s concept of spiritual violence is, thus, both a wider and a narrower concept than               
Panchuk’s concept of religious trauma. For spiritual violence need not rise to the level of               
trauma (thereby making it a wider category), but it does require the survivor to have               
internalized the teaching that so harms them (thereby making it a narrower category).​8             
Moreover, we assume that the harms caused by spiritual violence cannot be justified by              
reference to some future good or future prevention of harm, such as in the case of medical                 
intervention to remove a tumour, or plastic surgery to improve one’s appearance.​9 In this              
essay, we deal with cases where spiritual violence does rise to the level of trauma, and so                 
are cases of both spiritual violence and religious trauma, spiritually violent religious trauma,             
one might say. How is it that such cases of spiritually violent religious trauma can result in                 
deconversion? This is the question that will occupy us for the remainder of this essay. The                
first step in doing is to think about the nature of faith, particularly as an interpersonal                
relationship. 
 
Faith and love 
If we aim to give a philosophical explanation for how the actions of other people can cause a                  
person to lose their faith in God, we need to specify what we take faith in God to be. This is                     
the task to which we now turn. To do this, we observe that Christians are called to two                  
things (among others): to have faith in God and to worship him. We think that there is an                  
intimate connection between the two, and that this relationship will help explain how it              
could be that the actions of other people can cause a person to lose their faith in God. 
fundamentally shapes her feelings about the divine. Whatever she may come to            
believe about her parents’ behavior and about God, she cannot shake the deep             
sense of fear, guilt, shame, and revulsion she has at any attempt to address herself               
to God. (2018, 514) 
 
Case 2: A young boy is raped by a clergy member in his church and sworn to secrecy                  
in the name of God. The clergy member tells him that disclosing the abuse to anyone                
will hurt the reputation of the church and undermine the work of God in the world.                
Whatever this child may come to believe about the church, the sight of a priest or                
even a church building continues to make him physically ill. (2018, 514) 
8 We are indebted to Panchuk’s (n.d., 5) helpful discussion of the relationship between              
religious trauma and spiritual violence here. 
9 That is, we are not assuming that the Christian life must be devoid of harm—C.S. Lewis’s                 
description of Aslan is an apt summary of how God is often presented in Scripture: ‘he isn’t                 
safe. But he’s good. He’s the king, I tell you’ (2016, 58). However, we assume that the harm                  
suffered by victims of spiritual violence cannot be justified by appealing to the ongoing work               
of sanctification. 
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To begin, we take faith in God to be an attitude of allegiance to God, that is, an                  
attitude of loyal commitment to God in recognition of his unsurpassable greatness.​10 Such             
an attitude is typically expressed in worship, where we acknowledge this commitment by             
praising God for his greatness, confessing that we have fallen short of our commitment to               
him, thanking him for all that he has given us, offering gifts to him in grateful response, and                  
praying to him that we might draw closer to him. In so doing, we cultivate an attitude of                  
worship, an attitude that is intended to carry over from participating in acts of worship to                
our everyday lives.  
To explain this attitude more clearly, such an attitude of worship is an attitude              
toward God that, in Nicholas Wolterstorff’s words, is ‘awed, reverence, and grateful            
adoration’ (2015, 26). We can see it expressed in the first stanza of the Gloria in Excelsis                 
Deo, something said or sung in many worship services: 
  
Glory to God in the highest, and on earth peace to people of good will. We praise                 
You, we bless You, we adore You, we glorify You, we give You thanks for Your great                 
glory. 
 
If this stanza expresses, more or less, what it is to have an attitude of worship to God, then                   
having an attitude of worship to God involves love for him, since adoration is a mode of                 
love. In Wolterstorff’s words, adoration is ‘a mode of love, specifically love as attraction. To               
adore something is to be drawn to it on account of its worth, to be gripped by it; we speak                    
of adoring some person, some work of art, some scene in nature’ (2015, 25). Thus, if having                 
faith in God is intimately connected to having an attitude of worship toward him, which is a                 
mode of love for him, then having faith in God is intimately connected to loving him: to                 
being drawn to him and gripped by him on account of his worth.  
 
Love and union 
Having come to the view that having faith in God (at least the kind of faith in God at issue in                     
this paper) involves loving him, we now need to think about what it is to love someone, for                  
this will help us see how it is that others can cause a person to lose their faith in God                    
through shaming them with religious texts and rituals. Thankfully, Eleonore Stump has given             
an account of love that makes this possible, where to love another person requires both               
personal revelation and personal engagement, both of which can be undermined by            
spiritually violent religious trauma.  
Drawing from Aquinas, Stump argues that to love another person is to have two              
interrelated desires, namely, the desire for the good of the beloved ​, and the desire for               
union with the beloved ​(2010, 91).​11 For our purposes, the desire for union is the most                
10 For a detailed exploration of faith as allegiance grounded in the theology of Paul and the                 
Gospels, see Bates 2017. For Bates, faith as allegiance comes to: ‘ ​mental affirmation​ that             
the gospel is true, ​professed fealty​ to Jesus alone as the cosmic Lord, and ​enacted            
loyalty​ through obedience to Jesus as the king’ (2017, 92; emphasis in the original). For the               
purposes of this paper, we take no stand on this particular account of faith as allegiance, as                 
working out the consistency of Bates’s account of faith as allegiance and the one proposed               
above is beyond the scope of this paper. 
11 Importantly, this desire for union is a conditional desire on Stump’s account. For example,               
a person can still love another, and so desire union with them, but only conditional on                
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crucial of these desires, and so we’ll go into some detail into what union with another                
person consists in. On Stump’s account, union with another person requires mutual            
closeness and significant personal presence. We consider each in turn. 
To be close to another person, you have to reveal yourself to them, that is, share                
important thoughts and emotions with them. Call this ‘personal revelation’. Now, in order to              
reveal such important things about yourself, you have to be wholehearted in your desire for               
them, that is, you can’t be conflicted in your desire for the other person, for that would                 
mean that you would hold back things that are important to you, and thereby limit your                
personal revelation. Stump explains: 
 
If Jerome wants to reveal his thoughts and feelings to Paula and if Jerome desires               
Paula in the sense just described, but if Jerome is alienated from his own desires as                
regards Paula—if he desires to have different desires from those he has regarding             
Paula because he thinks that his relationship to Paula is detrimental to his             
flourishing, for example—then Paula is not close to Jerome. … The relation that            
results from such an internal conflict on the lover's part undermines the lover's             
closeness to the beloved. For one person Paula to be close to another person              
Jerome, it is therefore necessary that Jerome have psychic integration of desires, or             
whole-heartedness. (2010, 125) 
 
For example, if Jerome is to be united with Paula, he can’t on the one hand, desire union                  
with her, but on the other, desire to be separated from her (a first-order desire) or desire to                  
desire to be separated from her (a second-order desire). This is what it is to be                
wholehearted in his desire for union with her. And this is (part of) what personal revelation                
requires, and so, in turn, (part of) what union with another person requires. 
Having given an analysis of the mutual closeness required for personal union, let’s             
now look at the significant personal presence also required for union. What is it to be                
present in this way to another person? Say that you sit next to someone on the bus. You’re                  
aware of them, and you interact with them directly and immediately, and the person is               
conscious (it’s not a late-night bus), and so you’re having a second-personal experience of              
them, but you don’t know them because, even though you’re both present, you’re not              
present ​to one another (as in, ‘We had dinner together, but she was not present to me, as                  
she was on her phone all evening’). Such experiences fall short of significant-personal             
presence, which, for Stump, is necessary for union.  
As she explains, significant personal presence requires a kind of second-personal           
experience in which each person is aware of the other in a direct and immediate way, and                 
they attend to one another, just what is missing in the bus example above – though you may                  
share a second-person experience with the other person, neither of you are attending to the               
other, only to, for example, how long the bus is taking to get you where you want to go. This                    
kind of mutual attending psychologists call ‘joint attention’.​12 Thus, Paula’s significant           
certain obstacles to that union being removed, such as behaviour on the beloved’s part that               
makes the lover feel unsafe. 
12 To describe it simply, joint attention is a form of social engagement in which we are aware                  
that another person is ‘in engagement with an object or potential object as a process over                
time’ (Reddy, 2012, 137). As Axel Seemann notes in his volume on joint attention, although               
‘the discussion of joint attention is anything but unified’ (2012, 1), there’s a common              
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personal presence to Jerome requires her to have second-personal experiences and to share             
attention with Jerome, the conjunction of which we’ll term ‘personal engagement’. So, to             
sum up: to love another person requires personal revelation and a wholehearted desire for              
union with them, and, achieving this union, in turn, requires personal engagement.  
 
In order to form a more perfect union​13 
It’s important to note at this point that union between persons comes in degrees—the              
degree of union you have with a friend or colleague is typically less than the degree of union                  
you have with a family member or a partner. Part of the reason for this is that you know                   
your family member or partner better than you know your friend or colleague. Indeed, you               
might even say that you know a family member, or your partner, well. But what is it to know                   
someone well? Answering this question will help us see what lesbian and gay people lose               
when they suffer from spiritually violent religious trauma. 
According to Bonnie M. Talbert, knowing someone well ‘is normally the product of a              
sequence of interactions’ that have, minimally, the following features:  
 
1. We have had a significant number of second-person face-to-face interactions with A,            
at least some of which have been relatively recent.  
2. The contexts of those interactions were such as to permit A to reveal important              
aspects of her/himself, and A has done so. 
3. A has not deceived us about him/herself in important respects. 
4. We have succeeded in accurately perceiving what A has revealed – i.e. [our             
judgement is not impaired] by [our] own biases. (2015, 194) 
 
In addition to these conditions, which constitute a ‘breadth requirement’ for knowing a             
person well, that is, having a certain quantity of shared interactions that meet certain              
conditions, Talbert proposes that there is a ‘depth requirement’ as well: 
 
5. The history of their shared interactions contains ‘at least a “critical mass” of shared              
experiences that were deeper in cognitive and/or emotive content than we typically            
have with mere acquaintances – i.e., contexts in which thoughts and feelings we take              
to be meaningful and important were shared’. (Talbert, 2015, 200) 
 
position which all discussions of joint-attention share, namely ‘that an adequate           
understanding of the life of the mind has to pay particular attention to its social dimension’                
(2012, 2). This is often filled out by thinking about the social development of infants. An                
infant’s awareness and engagement with other persons develops over time, and begins with             
a kind of dyadic-joint-attention, that is, attention which requires only awareness of another             
person through a kind of mutual gazing. The ability to jointly-attend then develops into a               
kind of triadic joint-attention, that is, joint-attention in which an infant gains the ability to               
focus on some independent object whilst remaining aware of the other person (Reddy,             
2005, 85-87). To clarify with an example: when a child looks her mother in the eye, then                 
points toward an object, and then looks back to the eyes of the mother, if the mother                 
follows the direction of her child’s gaze, then they had a dyadic joint-attention to begin               
with, followed by a triadic joint-attention focusing on the object (Reddy, 2012, 145). 
13 Taken, of course, from the preamble of the Constitution of the United States of America. 
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Meeting this depth requirement means that the two people then come to share a world               
together. And the more they meet both the breadth requirement and the depth             
requirement, the more of a world they share and so the more they know one another,                
which then allows for a greater union between them.  
Now, to share more of a world with another person requires a kind of know-how, a                
knowing how to engage that person. As Talbert writes,  
 
[T]o know another is to know how to successfully interact with him/her over time.              
Knowing how to interact with a particular person starts with the largely ineffable             
ability to recognize him/her, which recognition comes to be associated with a more             
complex mental representation of that individual…Our interactive skills are largely          
intuitive and difficult to express in propositional terms. For example, when I am             
talking to Shannon, I find that I pace my remarks differently than I do when I am                 
talking to Deme. Without thinking about it I seem to adjust the pace of my               
conversation to what I somehow perceive is most suitable to the interaction. (2015,             
196-197) 
 
What Talbert draws attention to here is that a part of what it is to come to know a person                    
well over time is to develop a certain kind of skill. This will be important when we come to                   
consider the role of worship in coming to know God, to which we now turn. But before                 
doing so, to sum up: the greater union you have with a person, the more you know them,                  
and the more you know them, the better you are at engaging with them. 
 
The practice of worship and knowing how to engage God 
So far, our concern has been with thinking about faith and the attitude of worship and how                 
these relate to one another in a desire for a union of love. Now, we are in place to think                    
more carefully about the practices of worship, how they relate to faith and developing this               
desire for a union of love. So, in this section, we address the relationship between the                
practice of worship and knowing how to engage God. We argue that the practice of worship                
is a good way for a person to acquire knowledge of how to engage God, and the greater                  
frequency and variety of practices of worship a person engages in, the greater their              
knowledge of how to engage God. 
As Wolterstorff notes, the practices of worship, specifically liturgy, provide us with            
actions which express this orientation of love towards God. The actions involved in liturgy,              
he notes, are not one way, but rather, they are mutual acts (2015, 66-67). That is, not only                  
do we express our adoration to God through the central pattern of thanking, blessing and               
petitioning, but also, we make space for God to respond by listening and speaking to us                
(2015, 71). Thus, as Wolterstorff writes, the ‘reciprocity of orientation brings into existence             
an I-thou relationship between God and us. God is a thou for us. (2015, 61). In other words,                  
for Wolterstorff, through the engagement with the practices of the Church, a person is able               
to orientate herself towards God in a mutual relationship which involves mutual address             
and adoration.  
We’ve suggested that an important part of loving and desiring union with another a              
person is that we seek opportunities to engage with that person. The degree of union we                
have with another is partly dependent on our knowledge of how to engage that person.               
We’ll argue here, that one of the crucial roles of the practice of worship is to provide us with                   
this kind of personal-know-how in relation to God. And thus, there are important             
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implications for those that are excluded from the practices worship (whether this be             
through a kind of self-exclusion or because of the community’s exclusion).​14  
As Terence Cuneo has argued, the practices involved in liturgical worship can            
contribute to a person’s personal knowledge of God. Indeed, Cuneo seems to have in mind a                
concern very similar to Talbert’s when he talks of ‘building a rapport’ with a person by                
gaining a kind of personal know-how (2016, 148). On Cuneo’s account,  
 
[L]iturgy makes available act-types of a certain range such as chanting, kissing,            
prostrating, and eating that count in the context of a liturgical performance as cases              
of blessing, petitioning, and thanking God…If this is correct, the liturgy provides the             
materials for not only engaging but also knowing how to engage God. Or more,              
precisely: the liturgy provides the materials by which a person can acquire such             
knowledge and a context in which she can exercise or enact it….to the extent that               
one grasps and sufficiently understands these ways of acting, one knows how to             
bless, petition, and thank God in their ritualized forms. One has ritual knowledge.             
(2016, 163) 
 
Thus, it seems that the practice of worship is a good way for a person to acquire knowledge                  
of how to engage God.​15 
What’s more, not only can the practices of worship allow a person to acquire              
knowledge of how to engage God, but also, we think, they can allow a person to gain a                  
14 Moreover, this also appears to fit an account of faith as an orientation towards union or                 
relationship with God. Paulina Silwa (2018) gives a similar account of faith in which faith               
requires certain dispositions to perform certain ‘acts of faith’ (2018, 247). The result of              
which, Silwa goes on to argue is that  
 
[h]aving faith, is in part, a matter of being disposed to perform acts of faith. In fact,                 
we can say something stronger: to the extent that I have faith…I have the ability to                
perform acts of faith…Faith is, in part, a matter of having the ability to perform acts                
of faith. Acts of faith require the right kinds of desires along with the relevant know                
how. And so, this suggests that having faith is, in part, a matter of having the right                 
kinds of desires along with the right kind of know how. It’s partly constituted by               
these desires and the know how in question. (2018, 254) 
 
If Silwa is right, then faith involves or requires a certain kind of know-how. Silwa suggests                
that the practices of worship are a good example of acts which might count as acts of faith                  
and thereby give us the kind of know-how required for her account of faith (2018, 260).  
15 In ‘Common Ritual Knowledge’ (2019), Joshua Cockayne argues that these practices of             
engaging God through liturgy appear to be importantly corporate in nature. He suggests             
that it’s not the individual who knows how to engage God, but the community, and,               
consequently, it’s not the individuals who know how to engage God, but the community.              
Just as a violin player knows how to play her part in an orchestral symphony, rather than                 
knowing how to perform the symphony, it seems that what an individual comes to know is                
importantly embedded in a community in certain respects. As we’ll return to it shortly, this               
has important consequences for considering cases in which individuals are isolated from the             
community of the Church. 
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deeper and broader personal know-how in relation to God, too. As we’ve argued elsewhere              
(Cockayne and Efird, 2018), corporate worship, in particular, can provide a variety of             
contexts in which to personally engage with God, and thereby, to root out the biases is                
one’s own knowledge and experience of God. We suggest that corporate worship can play              
the kind of broadening and deepening role in our experience of God, something that will be                
important at the conclusion of this essay when we come to discuss how lesbian and gay                
people who have lost their faith might be nurtured back into it. For at least a part of what it                    
is to engage with another in a variety of contexts, depends on our wider social relationships.                
Not only is our personal knowledge dependent on our shared experiences and shared             
knowledge, but also, we might think, it depends on our wider relationships. Personal             
relationships are rarely one-to-one. In knowing a person, we have experienced them in             
interaction with many other people, in different family situations, in different friendship            
groups and social environments. All these different environments for experiencing a person            
make a difference to our knowledge of how to engage that person. C.S. Lewis makes this                
point in his discussion of friendship in the ​Four Loves​: 
 
[I]f, of three friends (A, B, and C), A should die, then B loses not only A but ‘A’s part                    
in C’, while C loses not only A but ‘A’s part in B’, while C loses not only A but ‘A’s part                      
in B’. In each of my friends there is something that only some other friend can fully                 
bring out. By myself I am not large enough to call the whole man into activity; I want                  
other lights than my own to show all his facets. Now that Charles is dead, I shall                 
never again see Ronald’s reaction to a specifically Caroline joke. Far from having             
more of Ronald, having him ‘to myself’ now that Charles is away, I have less of                
Ronald. Hence true Friendship is the least jealous of loves. (1960, 73-74) 
 
Just as your knowledge of how to engage a friend is partly informed by your experience of                 
that friend in interaction with other friends, so our knowledge of how to engage God is                
informed by our experience of God in interaction with others. Indeed, the presence of other               
people can not only colour our own experience and engagement with God, but also shape               
our perception of God by pointing out aspects of God which we wouldn’t or couldn’t notice                
alone. By sharing-attention with other members of a congregation, even in a relatively             
minimal way, we can be drawn to aspects of God’s character that we wouldn’t have noticed                
alone. Consider the following examples:  
 
[You are] participating in corporate worship alongside a friend whom you know has             
been suffering with depression. Suppose you are aware of God’s presence and are             
sharing attention with him throughout the liturgy, whilst also being aware of your             
friend. After receiving communion, you notice that something has changed in your            
friend—his shoulders are lifted, his eyes are brighter, and he manages a contented             
smile to you across the pew. As you become aware of this, you suddenly come to the                 
realisation that God has brought some kind of healing to your friend. In seeing God’s               
interaction with your friend (albeit in an indirect way), corporate worship has            
allowed you not only to see your friend’s perception of God, but in some way, you                
see more of God as an object. Your knowledge of God as a person has been                
deepened and broadened by such an experience. (Cockayne and Efird, 2018, 315 fn.             
46) 
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When alone, we might have the tendency to focus on certain aspects of God’s              
character, and thereby build up a biased picture of God, in worship, it is possible to                
be guided by the focus of another’s attention. This change in our focus might simply               
be by means of the emphasis another person places on certain words, the shape and               
posture of their body, or even the focus of their gaze (on, say, the altar, or the cross,                  
for example). All these ways might serve as pointers to redirect our own attention              
and thereby to experience some different aspect of God, thereby removing our            
biases in important ways. (Cockayne and Efird, 2018, 320) 
 
In these examples, our fellow congregants can play the role of deepening and broadening              
our knowledge of how to engage God in ways which we couldn’t achieve alone. Unlike               
Lewis’s discussion of friendship, a person’s relationship to God in this life is imperfect and               
patchy. This is where one’s dependence on the experience of the community of faith is all                
the more important—whilst one can’t know and experience God entirely, one can draw on              
the other members of the spiritual community for support. Not only this, but if our               
experience and knowledge of a person changes depending on the company one keeps, then              
this has implications for our understanding of worship. Engaging with God alone and             
engaging with God in community allow for different experiences of what God is like and               
require different kinds of practical knowledge of how to engage God. And thus, they can               
play a role in providing a person with a greater frequency and variety of practices of                
worship, and thereby provide a person with greater knowledge of how to engage God.  
So, to sum up all that has gone before, a person who has faith in God desires union                  
with God, and the degree of that union depends on the person’s self-revelation to God,               
their wholeheartedness in their desire for union with God, the extent of their personal              
engagement with God, and their knowledge of how to engage God, knowledge which is              
often acquired in corporate worship. 
 
Shame, spiritual violence, and personal union with God 
We’re now in a position to connect the account of faith in God and union with him outlined                  
above with the question of how lesbian and gay Christians who undergo spiritually violent              
religious trauma can lose their faith in God because of spiritually violent religious trauma.              
When lesbian and gay Christians are taught that their desire for same sex-relationships is              
sinful, they often experience a kind of psychic fragmentation whereby, though they desire             
such relationships, they desire not to desire them. This is a conflict in their first- and                
second-order desires, and a conflict that goes right to the heart of their identity.  
In this regard, the attitude taken towards sexual desires of lesbian and gay             
individuals is importantly different to the attitude that might be taken to other sexual              
desires, such as desires for adultery or polygamy. The disapprobation of sexual desire in              
general is not a spiritual violence. It’s that the kind of disapprobation directed at              
homosexual desire, given the way in which that desire is constitutive of one’s identity, that               
elevates mere disapproval to the status of violence. However, to say that sexual desires are               
at the heart of one’s identity is not to undermine the importance of living out one’s identity                 
in Christ. Of course, any individual, regardless of sexual orientation, can define themselves             
primarily in reference to their sexual desires, rather than primarily in relation to Christ. We               
assume that there are lesbian and gay individuals who identify themselves primarily in             
relation to Christ who pursue same-sex relationships in faithful response to who they are in               
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Christ. For such individuals, experiences of spiritually violent religious trauma often cause            
the kind of conflict of desires we identify here.  
As Jimmy Creech, a former Methodist minister, whose credentials were taken away            
for conducting a marriage ceremony for two men, writes,  
 
Sin is among the most powerful words in the English language. While its biblical              
meaning is “separation from God,” it is commonly used to refer to behaviour             
considered objectionable, even hated, by God. No self-respecting person of moral           
character wants to sin or be known as a sinner. To be labelled a sinner is to be                  
rejected by God and society. . . To label as sin a person’s sexual orientation is an act                  
of spiritual violence. It defines the personal core, the very essence of a young              
person’s identity, as sinful. Believing you’re a sinner because you’re lesbian, gay,            
bisexual, or transgender creates severe emotional and mental anguish, especially for           
young people. Not knowing whom to trust or talk with about it, and feeling alone               
with the struggle to be who you are, creates a deeply personal crisis. Low              
self-esteem, self-hatred, and fear of exposure often result in ruined lives, broken            
families, depression, and, much too often, suicide. (2008, 322) 
 
This psychic fragmentation can then cause a person to reveal less of themselves to God. For                
they then become ashamed of themselves, becoming conflicted in their desire for union             
with God and for personal engagement with God. 
According to Stump (2010, 145, 116, 113), a person feels shame when they believe              
that it would be appropriate that they be rejected. She writes,  
 
[A] shamed person anticipates warranted rejection and abandonment on the part of            
real or imagined others, and consequently he is anxious about marginalization or            
isolation. His anxiety is directed towards a distance, an absence of union, forced on              
him by others with whom he himself desires some kind of closeness. His worry is               
therefore that real or imagined others will be warranted in lacking for him the              
second desire of love, the desire for union with him. (2016, 113) 
 
As she goes on to explain (2016, 113-116), whilst the feeling of shame is often associated                
with a person who has committed some kind of wrongdoing, there are also other cases of                
shame, such as when a person feels shame because of the wrongdoing of others, such as                
survivors of sexual assault, when a person has a disability, such as Joseph Merrick, the               
so-called Elephant Man, or when a person feels shame because they belong to a certain               
group, such as children of high-ranking Nazis. The primary effect of this feeling of shame is                
that it diminishes a person’s capacity for union with the person who is the focus of their                 
shame, as in the case of the wrongdoer, or even anyone at all, as in the other three cases of                    
shame.  
This analysis of shame, we think, is helpful in explaining why individuals might desire              
not to engage personally with God after experiencing spiritually violent religious trauma.            
Rembert Truluck highlights the following case: ‘A preacher, his face distorted with rage,            
shouts anti-gay slogans from his pulpit into a television camera’, he writes,  
 
A mother quietly tells her son that he is no longer her son because he has just                 
revealed that he is gay. She adds, “God doesn’t love you, and neither do I.” A                
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politician declares to a group of GLBT people, “God will destroy you!” A newspaper              
prints a series of letters to the editor that allows religious fundamentalists to vent              
their homophobic anger in irresponsible abusive distortions of the Bible. All of this is              
spiritual violence, and it is wounding and destroying far more lives than most people              
realize. Spiritual abuse hurts both the abuser and the abused. Hate is a bitter              
emotional diet. Being hated takes a heavy emotional toll on every victim of spiritual              
violence. Physical violence against homosexuals is unnecessary. Teach them to hate           
themselves enough, and they will destroy themselves and each other. (Truluck, n.d.) 
 
In recounting the impact of spiritual violence, Truluck maintains, ‘Spiritual violence can hide             
the face of God’ (Truluck, n.d.). Equally importantly, on the analysis we offer, spiritual              
violence can cause victims to hide their faces from God. This hiding from God is a result of                  
the effects of shame, or so we argue.  
The kind of shame that resonates most with the topic of this essay, that of the                
spiritually violent religious trauma ​lesbian and gay Christians have often been subject to, is              
the shame associated with disabilities, as in Joseph Merrick, the so-called Elephant Man.             
Stump writes,  
 
The dreadful distortions of his frame by his disease left him looking revulsive and              
fearful to others, who generally turned away from him. On traditional Christian            
doctrine, the depredations of nature are a consequence, even if an indirect one, of              
human sinfulness. On this view, there was no natural evil, and consequently no             
shame over defects of nature, before the sin resulting in the Fall. So, insofar as               
defects in nature are somehow thought to be a function of the post-Fall condition of               
the world, which is itself a function of human sin, then this kind of shame is also a                  
consequence of human sin, not of course on the part of sufferers such as Merrick,               
but on the part of the human race in its origins. (2016, 115) 
 
This is just the sort of shame many lesbian and gay Christians are made to feel, as if their                   
natures were ‘defective’, not outwardly, as in Joseph Merrick, but inwardly, that is, as if,               
inwardly, they are the Elephant Man. There could be no better characterisation of the              
shame that some lesbian and gay people have been made to feel in some churches, labelled                
as sinners, and so labelled as those rejected, even hated, by God. This then means that they                 
become conflicted in their desire for union with God. In response to believing themselves to               
be hated by God, they desire separation from him, even if, at the same time, some part of                  
them still desires union with him.​16 
16 See also Dawne Moon and Theresa W. Tobin’s discussion of ‘sacramental shame’ which  
 
results from conservative Christianity's allegiance to the doctrine of gender          
complementarity, which elevates heteronormativity to the level of the sacred and           
renders those who violate it as not persons, but monsters. In dispensing shame as a               
sacrament, nonaffirming Christians require constant displays of shame as proof that           
LGBTI church members love God and belong in the community. Part of what makes              
this shame so harmful is that parents and pastors often dispense it with sincere              
expressions of care and affection, compounding the sense that one's capacity to give             
and receive love is damaged. (2018, 451) 
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Dan Karslake tells a story of an email he received from a gay teenager following a                
national TV programme he produced on a well-known theologian, who was also a lesbian: 
 
Last week I bought the gun. 
Yesterday I wrote the note. 
Last night I happened to see your show on PBS. 
And just knowing that someday, somewhere, 
I might be able to go back into a church with my head held high, 
I dropped the gun in the river. 
My mom never has to know. 
 
That’s the email I received from a gay kid in Iowa in 1998, the morning after a                 
segment I produced about Rev. Irene Monroe aired nationally on PBS’s gay news             
magazine In the Life. . . In subsequent emails with that boy from Iowa, I learned that                 
he had felt completely overwhelmed because not only could he lose his biological             
family by coming out but also his church family, and indeed, God. Until he saw the                
story, he felt suicide was his only option. Yet there on television was a woman of                
deep faith who was also openly gay. I remember him asking, “Do you mean that I can                 
be gay and still believe in God?” 
My answer was, “Absolutely.” 
“Doesn’t God hate me?” 
“Absolutely not.” (2008, 4) 
 
Thankfully, this gay teenager had seen Karslake’s TV segment, and Karslake was able to help               
him see that God doesn’t hate him. But many lesbian and gay teenagers raised in church                
wouldn’t have been so lucky to have someone like Karslake. They would go on thinking that                
God hates them.  
This can then result in a person stopping engaging with God, and, in particular, in               
practices of worship. Jarrod Parker tells of his experience in his church, after trying and               
failing to change his sexual orientation: 
 
I soon found myself even more depressed because I wasn’t changing—and even            
more isolated. My church treated me like I had a disease. People who had been               
friends stopped speaking to me. I once sat in the second row at church, but I began                 
to feel I had to sit in the very back. (2008, 87) 
 
Needing to sit in the back of church is a symptom of shame, shame because of an apparent                  
‘defect’ of their nature, being treated as diseased. As Stump writes,  
 
[A] person who feels shame believes that others would be warranted if they were to               
“nil” him—that is, to repudiate a desire for him, rather than to desire union with               
him. That is surely at least part of the reason why a person suffering from shame                
wants not to be seen. He supposes that, if he were seen, others would be justified in                 
rejecting him. That is why shame is characterized by a desire to avoid the gaze of                
others, to be invisible. (2010, 145) 
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For many, this process doesn’t stop in the back of church, but leads right out of it, as the                   
person wants to avoid the gaze of other church members, and, at the end of the process,                 
even God himself. ​17 Thus, to explain why God may seem hidden from those who experience                
such trauma, we can appeal to this account of shame. A person who feels that it would be                  
appropriate for others to reject them will often withdraw from God, be reticent to share               
attention with him, and so will cease desiring personal engagement with God. This might              
not happen immediately; the way in which shame leads to disengagement with God will be               
emotionally complex in ways which there is not space to address here. Indeed, it might be                
that a shamed individual can recover their relationship with God after such an experience.              
But for many, such recovery of relationship is not possible, and their experience of shame               
means that they are no longer capable of desiring union with God. The result of this, is that                  
the degree of union they have with God will also decrease the less they desire engagement                
with God. And it can decrease to the extent that a person loses their faith entirely. For they                  
no longer reveal anything important about themselves to God, they no longer desire union              
with him, and they no longer engage with him. Because they were made to feel ashamed of                 
themselves. Church hurt really can cause deconversion.​18 
 
Conclusion  
Many take community to be essential to faith—that it’s important to nurture the faith of               
others. But if what we’ve argued in this essay is right, then the actions of others can have                  
not only a positive effect on a person’s faith, but also, a negative effect as well. For there’s a                   
dark-side of corporate engagement with God which is rarely discussed by philosophers and             
theologians. And that’s what we’ve aimed to bring to light in this essay. Specifically, using               
religious texts and rituals, church members can shame one of their own, particularly a              
lesbian or gay Christian, to the extent that they come to lose their faith in God. Feeling                 
ashamed, they no longer want the things that make up having faith in God – spending time                 
with him, sharing their thoughts and feelings about important things with him, and wanting              
to have a relationship with him. They don’t want these things because they feel it’s not                
right, or it makes them feel bad about themselves, or they just can’t do it anymore. And so                  
17 It’s important to note that the shift of a person’s perspective that occurs in the experience                 
of shame isn’t necessarily directed toward God, but, rather, at themselves. As Panchuk puts              
this point,  
 
One cannot appropriately engage in a loving relationship with God when one            
believes that God sees oneself as fundamentally flawed—flawed in a way that is             
somehow deeper or more fundamental than the normal proclivity to sin. (Panchuk,            
n.d., 5) 
 
Thus, spiritually violent religious trauma doesn’t give a person a reason (an epistemic             
reason, that is) to reject their faith; rather, it gives them a practical reason to stop doing the                  
things that maintain their faith, that is, sharing attention with God in activities such as               
worship. 
18 Deconversion, as we characterise it here, is a process which, unless significant             
intervention occurs, culminates in the complete loss of desire for union with God and              
faithful trust in God. 
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church hurt really can cause a person’s deconversion. Or so we’ve argued. To conclude, and               
to give a survivor the last word, what we’ve aimed to show in this essay is summed up well                   
by Marie Bacon, blogger and religious trauma survivor:  
 
When someone is hurt by the actions of others there are quips of “That wasn't real                
Christianity,” or, “This just proves that we all fall short and need Jesus.” . . . I guess                  
what I’m trying to get at is, if I say part of why I lost my faith is because of the actions                      
of others that hurt/angered/saddened/betrayed me, that‘s seen as an invalid reason,           
since it doesn‘t deal with the truth claims of the religion. But it doesn’t feel invalid, it                 
feels very natural and necessary. The painful or abusive actions of others wound and              
cause people not to want to be part of a group, and while that doesn‘t disprove the                 
claims of the religion itself, it does cast a dark light on it. If the actions of others                  
didn’t influence our ability to find or lose faith, then there’d be no point in our faith                 
communities. Religion is not an entirely intellectual exercise, thank God, but it seems             
that the only legitimate reasons to lose religion are intellectual only. I can convert              
because I felt a warm stirring in my soul, but if my soul feels arid and parched and                  
wounded, that’s not a reason to leave. . . It’s like the religion—it’s traditions,              
doctrines, holy books, leaders—has a knife in your back. And with each word or              
action they twist it more and more. The reality of the knife doesn’t prove or disprove                
the claims of the religion, but damn it’s extremely difficult to keep holding your back               
against the blade. The pain causes you to doubt why you’re part of this group in the                 
first place. I think Christians need to own the fact that their own behavior can be the                 
gust of wind that blows out smoldering wicks and finally snaps the bruised reed in               
half. People can’t be expected to stay in the midst of that. We like to talk about faith                  
as something that should exist in a vacuum and shouldn’t be impacted by the              
behavior of others, but we also say our faith communities are important in the              
development of someone’s spiritual journey. We can’t have it both ways. We can’t             
put the hurting and wounded through the bait and switch of, “You need us to have                
faith, but we aren’t to blame when we hurt you so much that you want walk away                 
from it.” (Bacon, 2015)​19 
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